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Abstract
This paper shows that the q-exponential function rationally evaluate the
time discounting. When we consider two processes of wealth accumulation
with different frequencies, then the discount rate and the relative frequency
between them are essentials to choose the best process. In this context,
the exponential discounting is a particular case, where one of the processes
has a much higher frequency related to the other. In addition, one can
note that some behaviors observed empirically in decision makers, such as
subadditivity, magnitude effect, and preference reversal, are consistent with
processes which have a low relative frequency.
Keywords: hyperbolic discounting, q-exponential, discounted utility model
1. Introduction
The expected utility theory has axioms that define a rational decision
maker [1], but experimental observations showed behaviors that violated
them [2]. One of the most well documented empirical observation of theses
behaviors is the hyperbolic discounting [3]. When mathematical functions
are explicitly fitted to experiment data, then a hyperbolic shape fits the data
better than the exponential form [4, 5, 6, 7]. However, the q-exponential
function
e−ρnq ≡ [1− (1− q)ρn]
1
1−q
allows greater flexibility of fit for hyperbolic, exponential, and quasi-hyperbolic
discounting [8, 9, 10, 11].
Although hyperbolic discounting provide a convenient way to model be-
havior, such design is not theoretically explained. So, in this paper is used
the proposed method in [12] to explore it from a rational perspective, where
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the averaging wealth growth is evaluated over time without the need for a
utility function, only a dynamic is specified to characterize the growth.
To compute the time average, it should be considered that the market
has various strategies and processes interacting [13]. In this context, it is
shown here that the q-exponential discounting is a rational solution to the
intertemporal choice problem, when two processes have different outcomes
and time probabilities. More specifically, consider two processes which allow
“receiving m” with probability sm and “receiving M” with probability sM ,
where M > m and both rewards are received after a brief period (a day or an
hour). Then, the delaying of the amount M in a longer time horizon (n brief
periods later) takes us to the discount function e−ρnq , where ρ is the discount
rate and 1
q−1 =
sm
sM
is a relative frequency between these processes.
The relative frequency sm/sM usually tends to infinity when, in a short
period, receiving a large reward M is much more unlikely than a small re-
ward m (sM  sm). The reason for this is the existence of a consensus in the
market that large amounts are more arduous than small amounts. For ex-
ample, consider the possibilities to earn 1 dollar and 1 million dollars selling
candies tomorrow, where the probabilities of success are sm ≈ 1 and sM ≈ 0,
respectively. In this case, sm/sM → ∞ and, consequently, q tends to 1 by
right side to result in the exponential discount function.
In contrast, a subadditive discounting arises when the big reward is as
likely as the small reward or even more likely than it. For example, consider
that yesterday you won a lottery prize and heard this good news today.
Then, earning 10 dollars selling candies and receiving the 1 million dollars
prize have great chances in the near future. Thus, the relative frequency
between theses processes sm/sM is reduced (q > 1) and the function e
−ρn
q
discounts slowly over time. Consequently, if discounts are calculated at a
frequency greater than the relative frequency between the processes, then,
due to subadditivity, short delays are more discounted than long delays,
and small rewards are more discounted than large rewards. In addition, in
some cases, where frequencies and rewards are different, the delaying of both
rewards can reverse the performance of the wealth accumulation process,
justifying the preference reversal behavior.
2. Time preference problem
Time preference is the valuation placed on receiving a good on a short
date compared with receiving it on a farther date. A typical situation is
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choosing to receive a monetary amount m after a brief period (a day or an
hour) or to receive M > m in a distant time (after some months or years).
Formally, given two hypotheses about the receipt of amounts in different
instants in the future, Θm = “I receive m” and ΘM = “I receive M”, then
only one of them must be chosen. The hypothesis Θm represents the receipt
of the amount m in short period, tm = t0 + δt, and ΘM represents the receipt
of the amount M in longer time horizons, tM = t0 + ∆t.
We should point out that each hypothesis has an impact on the individ-
ual’s wealth. If an individual has a wealth W0 at present, then the proposition
ΘM has the change factor 1 +XM , while Θm has the change factor 1 +Xm,
where each rate of change factor is calculates as follows:
Xm = m/W0, (1)
XM = M/W0. (2)
Moreover, hypotheses θm and θM can be proposed with more modest
change factor, 1 + xm < 1 + Xm and 1 + xM < 1 + XM . In these cases, we
can express them by θm = “I receive an amount less than m” and θM = “I
receive an amount less than M”.
3. Similar statements in the future
A hypothesis is a proposition (or a group of propositions) provisionally
anticipated as an explanation of facts, behaviors, or natural phenomena that
must be later verified by deduction or experience. Formally, they should
always be spoken or written in the present tense because they are referring
to the research being conducted. However, in everyday language, hypotheses
are guesses for decision-making before the facts are verified. They express
the performance of stochastic processes with some certain sense.
The sense of certainty that we have about a hypothesis becomes evident
when we express it in the form of future statement. Given that a future
sentence indicates an event occurrence after the moment of speech, then it
can emphasize the fact realization with an intuitive implicit probability. For
instance, consider the following future statements for ΘM and θM :
FΘM = “It will at some time be the case that I receive M”;
GθM = “It will always be the case that I receive an amount less than M”.
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The statement GθM expresses certainty with the modifier “always”, while
FΘM expresses uncertainty about the instant that the action occurs through
the modifier “some time”. In temporal logic FΘM is equivalent to saying
which there is an instant t in the future where ΘM is true, i.e, ∃ t such
that (now < t) ∧ΘM(t), where ΘM(t) means that ΘM is true at instant t.
Meanwhile, GθM affirms that θM is always true in the future, θM(t) ∀ t >
now, [14].
About the sense of certainty, F is a weak operator because Θ is true only
once in the future, while G is a strong operator because it is true in all future
periods. If ΘM does not always come true, then we can investigate its sense
of certainty through the affirmative:
GFΘM = “I will frequently receive M”.
The future tense GFΘM suggest that the proposition ΘM may alternate
its logical value several times in the future, but there will always uncertainty
about the logic value in any future instant. The adverb “frequently” esti-
mates the frequency at which it is true.
Can two hypotheses with different probabilities and rewards perform sim-
ilarly when repeated indefinitely? The frequencies in which the propositions
ΘM and θM represent gain are different. In addition, the changes proposed
by them are different too. After all, the affirmative GFΘM communicates
that the individual will frequently receive M (change factor 1+XM). On the
other hand, GθM proposes a small change factor, 1 + xM , but continuously
over time. Thus, in order to solve this problem, let us consider τ(t) as the
total time where ΘM is true and t as the total time where θM is true. Then,
the same performance is achieved over time when (1 + xM)
t = (1 +XM)
τ(t).
If t is also the number of periods under observation, then ΘM is true with a
frequency given by
lim
t→∞
τ(t)
t
= p. (3)
Therefore, the relation between time averages of change factors, 1 + xM =
(1+XM)
p, indicates that the sentences GFΘM and GθM have similar goals in
the long run, although ΘM and θM have different outcomes and frequencies.
This similarity is denoted in this work by
GFΘM ∼ GθM . (4)
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We can have a stationary probability when t is big enough, but the in-
dividuals do not have as calculate this probability in practice. In addition,
the chances of achieving outcomes in market processes change over time.
For example, the probability of receiving a premium changes abruptly after
the draw. An alternative to solve this conceptual problem is to replace the
probability p by the sense of certainty SM , which is an imprecise sugges-
tion (intuition) for the time probability. Figure 1 presents some adverbs of
frequency that can suggest the sense of certainty in future tenses.
𝐺 always s = 1 
𝐺𝐹 
usually 
s > 1/2 frequently 
often 
sometimes s = 1/2 
occasionally 
s < 1/2 
rarely 
seldom 
hardly ever 
𝐺¬ never s = 0 
 
Figure 1: Adverbs of frequency that can suggest the senses of certainty, s. The quantifier
“always” indicates certainty, while “never” indicates impossibility. The other adverbs of
frequency express uncertainty about the future, 0 < s < 1.
The axiomatic system of temporal logic proposes that GθM ⇒ GNθM ,
where NθM stands for θM is true at the next instant. Therefore, the similarity
GFΘM ∼ GθM can be written by
FΘM ∼ NθM , (5)
when
1 + xM ≈ (1 +XM)SM . (6)
Thus, the statement “It will at some time be the case that I receive M”,
which have a change factor 1 + XM , is similar to the statement “It will be
case that I receive an amount less than M at the next moment”, which has
a change factor (1 +XM)
SM . Analogously, we have FΘm ∼ Nθm, if
(1 + xm) ≈ (1 +Xm)sm , (7)
where sm is the sense of certainty concerning the receipt of m on a short
date.
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The above procedure, which leads to the equations 6 and 7, is analo-
gous to linguistic meiosis, where the meaning of something is reduced to
simultaneously increase something else in its place. In the above mentioned
case, proposing NθM (receive an amount less than M at the next moment)
suggest greater certainty, because it makes the process more feasible. This
procedure is consistent with argumentative suggestions of the economist Eu-
gen von Bo¨hm-Bawerk, where individuals suffer from a systematic tendency
to underestimate future wants [15, 3].
4. Hyperbolic discounting
Now suppose, without loss of generality, that M is large enough so that
the individual prefers to receive it in the distant future. If we consider n =
∆t/δt periods, where n is the number of attempts to perform 1 + xm until
M ’s receipt date, then we have
(1 + xM) > (1 + xm)
n. (8)
Substitute the expressions 6 and 7 in above expression. Next, substitute the
expressions 1 and 2 to obtain(
1 +
M
W0
)SM
>
(
1 +
m
W0
)nsm
. (9)
In this case, the rational judgment of the “or” operation between change
goals is indicated by the maximum rate of change factor,
xM = max {xM , (1 + xm)n − 1}
=
(
1 +
M
W0
)SM
− 1. (10)
In general the time preference solution is presented through a discount
function. In order to use this strategy, it is necessary to develop the same
form on both sides of the inequality 9. For this, there is a value κ such that
κSM > m, where we can write(
1 +
M
W0
)SM
=
(
1 +
κSM
W0
)nsm
>
(
1 +
m
W0
)nsm
. (11)
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The discount function undoes the proposed future change in ΘM , that is,
1(
1 + M
W0
) = (1 + κSM
W0
)− sm
SM
n
. (12)
If SM is the sense of certainty to receive M on a farther date and sM is the
sense of certainty concerning the receipt of M on a short date (same date to
receive m), then multiplicative growth provides SM = nsM that result in
1(
1 + M
W0
) = (1 + κsM
W0
n
)− sm
sM
. (13)
Thus, it is possible to know the value M to be discounted in any n periods.
Equation 13 describes the hyperbolic discounting (1 − hnρ) 1h [8], or q-
exponential discounting [10], when we reparametrize it by doing
1
h
= − sm
SM
n = − sm
sM
, (14)
ρ =
κsm
W0
. (15)
The discount rate ρ is influenced by individual states of scarcity and
abundance of goods. For instance, let us consider an individual called Bob.
If an object is scarce for him (small W0), then he places a higher preference
(great ρ). Analogously, if W0 represents an abundance state for him, he
has a lower preference (small ρ). Therefore, the parameter W0 may cause
great variability in experiments to find ρ because the wealth distribution
follows the power law [16, 17, 18, 19]. In other words, the wealth W0 can
vary abruptly from one individual to another and, consequently, ρ varies
too. In Thaler’s experiment, he reported the median responses because there
was wide variation among subjects [20]. Moreover, in [3] was presented a
tremendous variability in the estimates of literature.
The ratio h = −sM/sm influences the shape of the curve over time, where
−1/h = 1/(q− 1) is the relative frequency between the wealth accumulation
processes. In order to understand this relation, we must remember that the
sense of certainty is an approximation (or intuition) of time probabilities,
which are occurrence intuitive frequencies of a event in a hypothesis. There-
fore, the ratio sm/sM communicates how feasible in time the hypothesis Θm
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is in relation to ΘM . For example, e
−ρn
q is equal to the exponential function
e−ρn when h → 0−. This means that the objective M is very unlikely in a
short period (sM  sm), but the process to reach it with a lower amount
has high occurrence frequency, sm/sM →∞. Thus, M can only be achieved
in the long run with persistent attempts to receive on average κsm in short
periods (See the dashed black curve in Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Discount function e−ρnq versus number of delayed periods: the dashed black
curve is the exponential discounting for ρ = 0.00509; the ◦-blue curve is quasi-hyperbolic
discounting for ρ = 5 and q = 16; and the ∗-red and cyan curves are hyperbolic discounting
for ρ1 = 0.0099 and q1 = 3, and ρ2 = 0.007 and q2 = 2, respectively. All these discount
functions are approximately equal to 0.5429 in n = 120.
On the other hand, would it be impossible for a large reward to be more
likely than a small reward? Such opportunities are rare, but when they
arise, they can abruptly change the prospect of wealth growth. For example,
consider that yesterday you won a lottery prize and heard this good news
today. So, earning $ 300 selling candy and receiving $ 1 million has a great
chance of success tomorrow. Hence, receiving $ 1 milion has low frequency
relative to usual market processes, such as selling candies, h < 0. Therefore,
in order to achieve a goal after a delay, it will be necessary to compensate
the low frequency of occurrences with large rewards in the short term.
The behavior of compensate the low relative frequency with larger rewards
can be observed in Figure 2, where we have different iterations of processes to
reach the discount 0.5429 after 120 periods. Since the exponential discount
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consists of a process with high relative frequency, then it is possible to reach
the goal with small short-term rewards (low discount rate, ρ = 0.00509).
However, other market processes need greater rewards in the short run to
reach the goal when the relative frequency falls. The most extreme case is
the quasi-hyperbolic discount (blue ◦-curve), which requires a large short-
term reward (ρ = 5), but it has the weakest discount after 120 periods, due
to its low relative frequency, q = 16.
5. Discussion
If the relative frequency is low, then the q-exponential discounting has
the subadditivity as a mandatory property in the time preference for positive
rewards. The reason for this is 1 − q = h = − sM
sm
always negative. On this
account, if h < 0 (q > 1), then we have
e−xq e
−y
q = e
−x−y+(1−q)xy
q < e
−x−y
q ∀ x, y > 0.
This property can be found in experiments of time preference. Daniel Read
pointed out that a common evidence in time preference is the “subadditve
discounting”, in others words, the discounting over a delay is greater when
it is divided into subintervals than when it is left undivided [21].
The q-exponential discounting has decreasing rate over time when a re-
ward is discounted through calculus of continuous compound interest. In
essence, we are compounding continuously when the frequency is increased
to its limit. Hence, if the continuously compounded interest rate is computed
over a process of low relative frequency, − 1
n
ln e−ρnq , then this rate decreases
when n increases. In order to verify this phenomenon as a consequence of
subadditivity, we can develop(
e−ρq
)n ≤ e−ρnq ⇒ − 1n ln (e−ρq )n ≥ − 1n ln e−ρnq . (16)
If h = 1−q does not tend to zero from the left side, then the average discount
rate over shorter time are observed higher than the average discount rate over
longer time horizons, i.e., the average monotonically calculates the expression
16, 〈− ln e−ρq 〉 > 〈− 1n ln e−ρnq
〉
. (17)
This means that if we discount processes with low relative frequency, as if
they have high relative frequency, then the experimental result may draw an
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graphic time effect, where the discount rate decreases with the time period
to be waited.
In intertemporal choice experiments, a similar “time effect” can be ob-
served as behavior. For example, it was asked to respondents in [20], how
much money they would require to make waiting one month, one year and
ten years just as attractive as getting the prize of $ 250 now. The median
responses (US $ 300, US $ 400 and US $ 1000) had an continuously com-
pounded annual discount rate of 219% over the one month, 120% over the
one year and 19% over the ten years. Other experiments presented a similar
pattern as discussed in [3].
In a second behavior, referred to as “magnitude effect”, individuals dis-
count small values more than large values. Here, this effect may also be a
consequence of subadditivity. The reason for this is because the magnitude
and time effects are mathematically similar in the q-exponential discounting.
More specifically, the discount rate is ρ = κsm/W0 and κ is growing for values
of M (see equation 11). In order to understand the similarity, note that the
function e−ρnq varies with nρ. If we fix the value n, for example n = 1, and
we vary only rate ρ = rρ0, where ρ0 is constant and r > 1 is a multiplier
which is growing for values of M , then we have the function e−rρ0q analogous
to e−ρnq . Therefore, the magnitude effect made by r, similarly to the time
effect, results in 〈− ln e−ρ0q 〉 ≥ 〈−1r ln e−ρ0rq
〉
.
The magnitude effect is observed in several intertemporal choice experi-
ments. For example, in Thaler’s investigation [20], the respondents preferred,
on average, $ 30 in 3 months rather than $ 15 now, $ 300 in 3 months rather
than $ 250 now, and $ 3500 in 3 months rather than $ 3000 now, where the
continuously compounded discount rates are 277%, 73% and 62%, respec-
tively. Other experiments have found similar results as discussed in [3].
Another observed behavior in experiments is the “preference reversal”.
Initially, when individuals are asked to choose between one apple today and
two apples tomorrow, then they may be tempted to prefer only one apple
today. However, when the same options are long delayed, for example, choos-
ing between one apple in one year and two apples in one year plus one day,
then to add one day to receive two apples becomes acceptable [20].
When we evaluate hypotheses as processes, the delay of rewards changes
its performance because the frequency at which it is true is altered. For
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example, consider two market processes, where the hypotheses θ = “I receive
M” and Θ = “I receive 2M” are evaluated over time. The future tense
Fθ(1) =“It will be case that I receive M today” is easier than FΘ(1) =“It
will be case that I receive 2M today”. Therefore, if we assume that Fθ(1) is
a certainty event, Fθ(1) = Nθ, then it is reasonable to assume that there is
some uncertainty in FΘ(1). However, θ and Θ are different processes. Thus,
if we assume that the uncertainty in Θ is low, so that receiving 2M today is
preferable, then(
1 +
M
W0
)
<
(
1 +
2M
W0
)s
, where 0 < s < 1. (18)
Now, consider delaying 2M until tomorrow. When the waiting time dou-
bles to receive 2M , FΘ(2) =“It will be case that I receive 2M tomorrow”,
then the frequency at which the hypothesis Θ is true is halved. Therefore,
even if s = 1, receiving M today is preferable because(
1 +
M
W0
)
>
(
1 +
2M
W0
) s
2
. (19)
For this reason, delaying a reward worsens the hypothesis. So, what happens
to performing the hypotheses, if we delay the rewards for different dates?
An example is considering the future tenses Fθ(n) =“It will be case that I
receive M in n days” and FΘ(n + 1) =“It will be case that I receive 2M
in n + 1 days”. Since the waiting time to receive M is shorter, then we can
realize that the number of trials to receive M will be greater in the future
((n+1)/n trials to receive M for each trial to receive 2M). Thus, the rational
choice between θ and Θ depends on the following result:
max
{(
1 +
M
W0
)n+1
n
,
(
1 +
2M
W0
)s}
.
When n = 1, then it will be preferable to receive the reward M (see equation
19). Depending on the value s, this can also happen to other small values of
n, for example, n equals 2 or 3. However, when n is large enough, the relation
(n + 1)/n tends to 1 and makes 2M a preferable reward (see equation 18).
Thus, the performances between the hypotheses reverse when the rewards are
shifted to a longer time horizon. Experimental results with similar behaviors
can be observed in humans [22, 23, 24, 25] and pigeons [26, 27].
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The nonextensive statistical economics, based on Tsallis entropy [28], pro-
vides description of asymptotic power laws [29]. In q-exponential discount-
ing, to deduce q = 1 + sM
sm
considering multiplicative dynamic for rational
decision-makers, without any consideration of nonlinear time-perception, di-
rectly shows as nonergodicity causes nonextensivity. Therefore, the relative
frequency between market processes, besides the discount rates, is relevant
to understand physical and psychophysical aspects of wealth growth.
6. Conclusion
The problem of choice between two processes with different outcomes and
frequencies is a reality within the complexity of the market. In this context,
this paper shows that the q-exponential discounting is a rational solution
for this problem, where the discount rate ρ and the relative frequencies be-
tween two processes, sm
sM
= 1
q−1 , are essential parameters to calculate the
discounting.
In usual situations in the market, large amounts are more arduous than
small amounts. Consequently, the relative frequency between two processes
is usually very high, because, in a short period, receiving a large reward M
is much more unlikely than a small reward m (sM  sm). For this reason,
the continuous compound interest, based on the exponential discounting, is
commonly used as an approximation.
On the other hand, a subadditive discounting may arise when the big
reward is as likely as the small reward or even more likely than it. On this
account, the relative frequency between processes (q > 1) is reduced and the
function e−ρnq discounts slowly over time. Hence, if discounts are calculated at
a frequency greater than the relative frequency between the processes, then
mathematical aspects of nonextensivity are manifested, resulting in short
delays more discounted than long delays, and small rewards more discounted
than large rewards. In addition, in some cases, where frequencies and rewards
are different, the delaying of both rewards can reverse the performance of the
wealth accumulation process, justifying the preference reversal behavior.
The multiplicative dynamic, which result in nonergodicity of wealth stochas-
tic growth processes, exhibit aspects of nonextensive statistical mechanics.
Assuming rational decision makers, without any consideration of nonlinear
time-perception, it is possible to deduce a q-exponential function to discount
future amounts. Moreover, it is possible to show that some behaviors of
hyperbolic discounting are consistent with nonextensive aspects of wealth
12
growth. Therefore, behavioral finances should take into account the rela-
tive frequency between market processes, besides the discount rates, because
these factors are relevant in rational decision-making.
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